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M A T H E M A T IC S
COMBINATORY LOGIC AND THE AXIOM OF CHOICE
BY
H E N K  B A R EN D R E G T i)
(Communicated by Prof. A. H e y t i n g  a t  the meeting of December 16, 1972)
I n t r o d u c t i o n
The equational calculus combinatory logic (CL) can be extended by 
embedding it in the first order intuitionistic (classical) predicate logic. 
The resulting theories are denoted by (CL)i , (CL)c respectively. We can 
treat K  =  S  as absurdity, because from K  =  S  any formula can be derived.
In his Bucharest lecture (1971) S c o t t  considered the following axiom 
scheme of choice:
(AC) VxHyA(x , y) -> HzVxA(x, zx)
and showed tha t (CL)c +  (AC) is inconsistent. He suggested tha t (CL)i + (AC) 
might be consistent. At another occasion Scott suggested the use com- 
binators as a tool for realizability. By a combinatory version of Kleene’s 
(F |—)-realizability the following results are proved2):
1) (CL)i+ (AC) is a conservative extention of CL (and hence consistent).
2) (CL)j is closed under the rule of choice.
3) (CL)i and (CL)i+ (AC) are disjunctive and existential for arbitrary 
formulas (containing possibly variables).
Result 1) and some other conservative extention results can be summa­
rized as follows in fig. 1 (see also 4.7).
The method is extended in an obvious way to include extensionality 
in the results mentioned in 1), 2), 3) and fig. 1.
We see tha t the situation is somewhat different from intuitionistic 
arithmetic with Church’s thesis. In tha t context 1) and 2) hold, but 3) 
is obviously false, e.g. x = 0 V x ^0 ,  but neither x =  0 nor x # 0  (the dis­
junctive and existential property only holds for closed sentences).
1) The author is supported by the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement 
of Pure Research (Z.W.O.).
2) Independently  S t a t m a n  (1972) gives a normalization theorem for the 
intuitionistic theory of functionals of finite type with the axiom of choice from 
which 1), 2) and 3) follow implicitly.
conservative
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Fig. 1.
The reason tha t fov (CL)i + (AC) 3) is provable, is tha t it is possible 
to define a realizability concept which satisfies
where N  ranges over terms possibly containing free variables.
The fact tha t the existential property holds for arbitrary formulas,
i.e. tha t |— HxA(a, x) => |— A(a, M)  for some M,  is a stronger form of the 
so called “combinatory completeness” : all Skolem functions are definable.
On the other hand, the disjunctive property for arbitrary formulas,
i.e. |— A(a) V B(a) =>■ (— A(a) or |— B(a), shows a certain weakness of the 
theories considered: the union of two definable sets can only be proved 
to be the universe of one of them is the universe. As an attem pt to 
strengthen (CL)i one could add an axiom or rule expressing tha t the 
objects in the range of a quantifier behave like the objects given by the 
closed terms. This can be done in two ways, by an axiom of term in­
duction (TI), like the induction axiom in arithmetic, or by a term rule 
(T R ), like the co-rule in arithmetic:
T I : A(K)  A A(S)  A Vxy(A(x) A A(y) -> A(xy)) -> YxA(x)
T R : From A(Z)  for all closed terms Z, conclude VxA(x).
In contrast to what might be expected, there is no obvious way of 
realizing TI,  even if the realizability concept does not have the special 
property (*) mentioned above but is defined as usual. This is due to the 
fact tha t the components of a compound term Z\Z% are not retracable,
i.e. there is no term M  such tha t M(Z\Z<i) =  Z\  or M(Z\Zo) =  Zo. This in 
contrast to the case in arithmetic, where the predecessor of a numeral 
is retracable. Since for this reason it is doubtful tha t T I  is of interest, 
it is not considered any further in this paper.
Concerning TR  it is shown tha t (CL)c +  T7?-j-extensionality is consistent 
and tha t (CL)i -f T7?(-f ext.) is disjunctive and existential for sentences 
(the later by using Kleene’s r  |realizability concept). I t  is open whether 
( C L ) i (T R ) - \ - (A C )  is consistent.
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Finally it is shown tha t (CL)c + (TR) + exteiisionality is not a complete 
theory (which shows another difference with arithmetic).
The plan of this paper is as follows.
§ 1 is an introduction to CL proving its consistency by a Church-Rosser 
technique.
In § 2 CL is embedded in the first order predicate logic formulated as 
a system of natural deduction. This treatment simplifies the verification 
of the realizability of the provable formulas.
In  § 3 combinatory realizability is defined and is applied to prove the 
results 1), 2) and 3).
Finally in § 4 we consider extensions of the theory, consisting of ex- 
tensionality and the term rule.
At the end some open problems are stated.
§ 1. C o m b i n a t o r y  l o g i c
In  this § we will describe the equational theory combinatory logic and 
derive some of its elementary properties.
1.1. Definition
CL is a theory with the following language.
Alphabet: K,  S  constants
«o, ci2 , ... parameters x)
(,) improper symbols
= equality
Terms : Terms are defined inductively by
1) Any parameter or constant is a term.
2) I f  M, N  are terms, then (MN)  is a term.
Formulas’. If  M , N  are terms, then M  = N  is a formula.
1.2. Notation
As a syntactic notation to refer to arbitrary parameters we use the 
letters a, b, c etc.
M, N, L  etc. is a syntactic notation for arbitrary terms.
M iM 2 ... M n stands for (.. (.MiM%) ... M n) (association to the left).
I f  N  = N U ..., N n then M N  is M N X ... N n.
M  =  N  means tha t M  and N  are identical terms.
1.3. Definition
The theory CL  is defined by the following axioms and rules:
I 1. K M N  = M  
2. 8 M N L  =  M L(NL)
x) Or free variables. The name variable itself is reserved for bound variables.
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II 1. M = M
o M  = N  
' N  = M
3.
4.
M = N , N  = L 
M  = L
M  =  M' M  = M'
ZM  =  ZM'  ’ MZ = M'Z
In  the above expresses tha t ...2 is a direct consequence of ...1
1.4. Definition
Par (M) is the set of parameters tha t occur in M.
M  is closed iff P ar(il/)  = 0.
1.5. Definition
Let Par (M) C {ai, an} =  {a}, then sometimes we will m ite  M(a).
We say tha t N  corresponds to a if N  =  N \ , . . . , N n. M(N)  denotes the 
results of substituting simultaneously Nf for a,- in M.
1.6 . Lemma
If CL \-M\(a)  — M 2 (d), then CL \ -Mi(N)  = Mo(N).
Proof
Induction on the length of proof of =
The following consistency theorem for CL was proved first in C u r r y  
[ 1930]. We will show it by proving the so called Church-Rosser property 
for CL (imitating the proof of R o s s e r  [1935], T 12, p-144 for a slightly 
d iff ere nt svste m).
1.7. Theorem (consistency)
Not CL [- K  = S.
Remark
If K  = S  would be provable, the P  = Q for arbitrary P, Q would be
provable: M L  = K M N L  =  S M N L  =  ML(NL)  for all M, N, L.
Take M  =  L  =  I  and N  =  K P , P  arbitrary (where I  =  S K K  and has the 
property CL \- I M  = M ). Then I =  K P I  = P  for all P.
Hence for all P, Q P  = I = Q.
Proof
We extend CL to a theory CL' as follows: to the alphabet of CL we 
adjoin two binary predicate symbols >1  and > and we extend the defi­
nition of formulas accordingly.
O  t
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Furthermore we add the following axioms and rules.
K M N > i M 
SM N L  > !  ML(NL)
M  > i M
M  > ! M' M  > M ’
M > M '  ’ M = M'  
M > N, N > L
M > L
N > i N '  
M N > i M ' N '  
Lemma 1.7.1.
If CL' [— J /1 > i Mi and CL' |— M i ^51M 3, then there exists a term 
such tha t CL' |— M^> iM± and CL' \- (see fig. 2).
Fig. 2.
Proof
Induction 011 the length of proof of
case 1. is K M N > \ M .
subcase 1.1. M 3 =  K M N  or M 3 = M .  Then take M\ =  M . 
subcase 1.2. M 3 =  KM'N' ,  where CL' \r M > 1 M'  and CL' \ - N > lN'
Then take M 4 =  M ' . 
case 2 . M \ ^ i M o  is S M N L ^ i M L ( N L ) .  This case is treated similarly
to case 1.
case 3. M\  =  M 2 . Then take M± =  M 3 .
case 4. M\  > 1 M 2 is M N  > 1 M'N'  and is a direct consequence of M  > 1 M \
N > l N t.
subcase 4.1. M \ ^ \ M 3 is KPQ /^ iP .  Then go to case 1. 
subcase 4.2. is SPQR^\PR(QR) .  Then go to case 2 .
subcase 4.3. M\  =  M 3 . Then go to case 3.
subcase 4.4. M \ ^ \ M 3 is M N ^ \ M " N "  and is a direct consequence of
M > 1 M" and N > l N".
By the induction hypothesis there are terms M"\ N m such tha t M ' > 1 M"\
M " > XM ' \  N ^ i N " '  and N " > 1 N m. Then take M A =  M"'N"'. ■
Lemma 1.7.2.
If CL' and CL' |— M\  >  M 3 , then there exists a term M\
such tha t CL' |— M 2 > M 4 and CL' \- M 3 ^M^.
Proof
Realizing that
CL' \ - M > N  0 & N 1  ... Nk CL' \ - M > 1N i > 1. . . > 1N * > 1 N
we can complete a diagram like:
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by means of lemma 1.7.1 to a diagram like:
M i
m 3
■
Lemma 1.7.3. (Church-Rosser property for CL)
If  CL I—M  =  N,  then for some term Z CL' \ - M ^ Z  and CL' |—
Proo f
If CL \— M  = N,  then clearly CL' |—M  =  N.  By induction on the length 
of proof in CL' we show the conclusion, using 1.7.2. in the case of the 
transitivity of = . ■
From 1.7.3. it follows immediately tha t not CL |—K  =  S, since 
CL' f- => Z =  K  and similarly for S. ■ 1.7.
1.8 . Theorem (Combinatory completeness)
For every term M  and every parameter a, there exists a term Xa-M 
such that Par (Aa*ikf) =  Par (M) — {a} and CL \- (Xa • M)a  =  M  for arbi­
trary N.
Proof
Induction 011 the complexity of M.  
case 1. M  is a parameter or constant, 
subcase 1.1. M  a. Take Xa-M =  K M .  
subcase 1.2 . M  =  a. Take Xa*M =  S K K .  
case 2 . M  =  N 1 N 2 . Take (Xa-M) =  S(Xa-Ni)(?,a-N2 ). M
1.9. Notation
Xa\ ... an M  stands for (Aai*( ... (Xcin- M . .)).
1.10. Definition (Ordered pairs)
[Mo, Mi] =  Xz-zM\Mo.
(M) o =  M K
[M)i =  M K where K^=Xcib-b.
Then CL [- ([M0, M i])< =  M u i e {0 , 1}.
1.11. Theorem (Fixed point theorem)
For every term F  there exists a term Q such tha t CL \ -F Q  = Q.
Proof
Let co = Xa • (F (aa)) and Q = cooj.
Then CL \ -Q  = coco = (Xa-(F(aa)))co = F(coco) = FQ. ■
§ 2. F i r s t  o r d e r  t h e o r i e s  e x t e n d i n g  c o m b i n a t o r y  l o g i c
We will extend the equational theory CL by making it a first order 
theory. The intuitionistic first order extension is called (CL)i , the classical
(CL)c .
The common language of (CL)i, (CL)c is called (CL).
2. 1. Definition
(CL) is the following language
Alphabet: the symbols of the alphabet of CL
x0, x1} ... variables
A, V, D propositional connectives
V , H quantifiers.
Terms: Terms are the same as the terms of CL.
Formulas: Formulas are defined inductively by
1) Every formula of CL is a formula.
2) If  A, B  are formulas, then (A A B), ( i  V B) and (A D B) are formulas.
3) If  A  is a formula, x a variable not occurring in A,  then VxA*  and 
HxA* are formulas, where A* is obtained from A  by replacing oc­
currences of a parameter by x.
2.2. Definition
A (falsity) is an abbreviation for K  =  S.
—i A  is an abbreviation for A D A .
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2.3. Notation
Syntactic notations:
A, B, ... for formulas
M,  A7, ... for terms
a, b, ... for parameters
x, y, ... for variables
F,A,  ... for sets of formulas.
Identity between syntactic objects is denoted by = .
Par (^4) is the set of parameters tha t occur in A.  Par(JT) = U 4€r Par(^4). 
A is a sentence if Par(^4) = 0.
If  Par (^ 4) C (a) or Par (F) C (a) we write sometimes A (a) or r(a).  If
N  corresponds to a, A(N)  denotes the result of substituting simultaneously 
Ni for ai in A. r (N )  =  e r } .
Instead of giving the axioms and rules of (CL)i and (CL)c as usual 
in a Hilbert type system, we describe these theories in a natural deduction 
system a la Gentzen. See P r a w t t z  [1965] for a discussion of those systems.
Every rule is called after the logical symbol (e.g. A) which is introduced 
(A I) or eliminated (A E).
2.4. Definition
Let f u  {.4} be a set of formulas of (CL). We define the theory (CL)i 
by defining inductively r  |— A :
a  e r = >  r y - A
CL |— A =>- r  |— A,  where A is a formula of CL 
M )  r \ - A  and r  j- B  =► r  h  A A B 
A E) r \ - A f \ B = > r \ - A  and r  \- B
v/ )  r \ - A ^ r \ - A \ / b
r \ - B  = > t \ - a v  b  
V E) [F u  {A} 1- C, r  u  {B} [ -  C and r  | -  A V B] => F  f -  C 
D I) r  u  {A} b  B => F \- A D B 
DE)  F \ - A  and r \ - A 1  B => F \ - B  
VI) F |— A(a) =>■ F  |— VxA(x),  provided a $ Par (F) 
YE) F  [- VxA(x) => F \ - A ( N )  
31) F ]r A(N) = > r \ - K x A ( x )  
HE) F u  {A (a)} |— B and r  |—3[xA(x) => F  \ -B ,
provided a $ Par (T) U Par (B)
A) F u { A } \ - A
A is a theorem of (CL)j (notation |— 4^) if 0 |— A.
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To remember the deduction rules more easily we write them down 
in a more schematic way.
. A B A A AB A AB
A i ) 7 7 T b
v 1 ) 7 7 b ' J V b  v £ >
[A]
~J , ) 7 Sn i  3 E >
A ’ B
A \ J B  ^ G
C
A D  B A
B
Vx A(x)
A(N)
3xA(x )
HxA(x) £
A
The meaning of these schema’s is formalized in definition 2.4. See 
P r a w i t z  [1965] for a discussion. The rules VI) and HE) are subject to 
restrictions on the parameter a, as in definition 2.4.
2.5. Definition
(CL)c is defined by adding to (CL)i the following extra deduction rule:
Ac) r  u  {—i .4 ) \- A => r  \- A.
In  the schematic notation this is
H  A]
a  \  A  
Ac) i '
To distinguish it from the intuitionistic system we write r \ - c A (resp.
|—c A)  for the classical system (and r  \- A (resp. [—^ 4) for the intuitionistic 
system).
2 .6. Lemma
If  r(a)  |— + A(a), then r (N )  |— * ^[(iV), where N  corresponds to a and 
K  is h  or \-c.
Proof
Induction on the length of proof of r \ - +  A.
2.7. Lemma
\ - K  =£S (i.e. [ - - i  K  =  S).
Proof
Note tha t K  ^ S  stands for K  =  S D A, i.e. for K  =  S  D = >9. A natural 
deduction of this is
- « ]  .
K - S O K - S '
From now on derivations are not shown in detail anymore.
2.8. Definition
We define the following axiom scheme of choice (AC)
(AC) Vx3yA(x, y) D S[zVxA(x) zx).
2.9. Theorem (Scott)
(CL)c+  (AC) is inconsistent.
Proof
Since K  =£S , VxHy x ^ y . Hence by (AC) HzVx zx ¥=x, contradicting the 
fixed point theorem 1.8. ■
2 .10. Corollary
(AC) |-----1 Vx(x =  K  V x 7±K).
Proo f
Vx(x =  K  V x t^K) implies (in (CL)r) Yx'Ky x^=y. ■
2 .11. Corollary
Not |— (AC), i.e. not every instance of (AC) is derivable.
Proof
(CL)c has the canonical termmodel of CL  as model (in which K  
by 1.7) and is therefore consistent.
Hence not \-c (AC) and hence a fortiori not (— (AC). ■
2 .12. Theorem
(CL)c, and hence (CL)i , is conservative over CL.
Proof
If \-c M  =  N, then M  =  N  is true in all models of (CL)c, hence in par­
ticular in the canonical term model of CL  (with as domain the set of 
all CL  terms up to provable equality) and hence C L \ - M  =  N. ■
Remark
Theorem 2 .12. is a consequence of the following general fact. Let T  
be a set of quantifier free axioms (in a certain similarity type). Let Tprop
^ 1 2
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be the set of consequences of T  using proposition logic only. Let Tpred 
be the set of all consequences of T  (in the full first other language).
Then Tpreci is conservative over Tpr0p. In  the classical case this follows 
from the soundness of the predicate logic and the completeness of the 
proposition logic. In  the intuitionistic case this follows from the normal­
ization theorem for the intuitionistic predicate logic, see P r a w i t z  [1 9 6 5 ] .
§ 3. C o m b i n a t o r y  r e a l i z a b i l i t y
In  this § we discuss a combinatory version of Kleene’s (-T(-)-realizability 
concept ( K l e e n e  [1 9 5 2 ]  p .  5 03 ) .
3 .1 . Definition
Let A U {^ 4} be a set of formulas, M  a term (all of the language (CL))> 
where M  and A may contain free parameters.
We define inductively M taA (M  realizes-(zl |— )^4).
MrAN 1  =  N 2 o C L \ - N l =  N o .
M taA A B o  (M )o7*jx4 and (M)iTaB.
Mr ¿A [CL [- (M)o = K  or CL |— (M)o =  K^] and
[CL |— (M)o =  K  =>- ((M)irAA and A |-^4)] and 
[CL \- (M)o =  K^ ((M)iTaB  and A (-Æ)].
Mr a A D B o  for all N  [(NrAA and A |— A) => MNrAB].
MrAVxA(x) o  for all N  [MNrAA(N)].
MrA&xA(x) o  (M)orAA((M)i) and A |— ^4((ikT)i).
In  the above N  ranges over terms possibly with free parameters.
3.2 . Definition
Let Par (^4) =  {ai, ..., an}={a} .
MrrAA(a) (M strongly realizes-(zl [-)^4) iff for all N  MNrAA(N).
3.3 . Definition
Let r = { A i ,  . . . , A n] be a finite set of formulas.
/A  f D  A =  i i D  (A2 Z) ... ( A n D A )  ... ) if n¥= 0
=  A if 7i =  0
MrrAT |— A o  MrrA AY f D  A.
3.4 . Definition
r  |— A is (strongly) realizable if r  is finite and there is a term M  such 
tha t M (r)rA r  \- A for all A .
3.5. Lemma
i) MrrA A => M  a ta A,  where {a} = Par (A)
14 Indagationes
ii) [A [— A o  A' (— A] => (r)rj and (r)rA' are identical relations
iii) [M(r)rj A and CL |— M  = M'] => M'(r)rA A
iv) [M(r)rA A(N)  and CL \ - N  =  N'] => M(r)rA A(N').
Proof
i) By definition. (The converse is false: take A =  (a =  K D S  =  K))
ii)—iv) Induction on the definition of rj.
3.6. Lemma
If  r  is finite and F \ - A ,  then r  \ - A  is strongly realizable.
Proof
Induction on the length of proof of r  \ -A .
case 1: A e F. Let r =  [Ai, ..., A n)  and A = A[. Let m — mi, ..., mn and
a = P a r ( / 1U {^ 4}). Define M  =  Xam • (ra* a) . Then Mrra r \ - A .  
case 2: C L \ - A .  Then AYrj r  \ - A  by lemma 1.6 . 
case 3: r \ - A  is the conclusion of a rule of inference. One has to show 
by examining the rules tha t the conclusion is strongly realizable assuming 
tha t the assumption(s) is (are) strongly realizable (induction hyj)othesis). 
We will show this only for the rules A I), A), VI)  and HE), the other 
rules being left to the reader.
In the verification we will first assume that the onty parameters oc­
curring in the rule are the ones explicitely shown (simple proof).
In this proof r  is always {A\, ..., A v) and M r  =  M i , . . . , M n resp.
m r = m i ,  ..., mv corresponding sequences of terms resp. parameters.
We write M r r  a F  iff Mir  a A i and A \-Ai ,  1 < i < p .
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Then M r a F  |— A -*=- for all Mr[M rrj r  =&M M r r  a  A],
. a b  . r\-A r\-B 
' '  ) AAB  1 ,e ' r\-Af\B ■
Simple proof (assuming there are no parameters):
By the induction hypothesis, for some Mi, M 2 we have M irr^F |— A 
and MorrAF \- B.
Define M  =  ?,m[Mi m, M 2 m], then Mrra F |— A A B .
Detailed proof:
By the induction hypothesis, for some Mi, M 2 we have M i t t j r  |— A 
and MoWaF |— B.
Let Par (F) =  {a0} =  {a0i, a0»0}
Par (F u  {x4}) = («1}
Par (F u  {B}) = {a2}
Par ( f u  {.4, B}) =  {a}.
Then {ao} C {«ij u  {a2} =  {a).
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Hence for all Ni, N 2 corresponding to a\, ci2 we have
M x N x n  AY r ( N l ) 'DA(N1)
and
M 2N 2ta AY r(iV2) D P ( ^ 2).
Let n, m correspond to a, T.
Let n 1, ?i2 be the subsequences of n corresponding to ai, «2-
Define J f  = Xnmr-[Minimr,  M 2 U2 mr]. Claim Mtta r \ - A i \ B .
Fix iV corresponding to {a}. Let N q, iVi and iV2 be the subsequences
corresponding to ao, tfi and «2.
We have to show
M N ta AY r(iV) D .4(iV) A B{N).
Suppose MrTAr(N).
Now r (N)  =  r(Ni)  =  P(A7o), i =  1, 2 and ^4(iV) =  ^4(iVi), P(iV) =  B(N 2 ).
Hence ikfiN±Mrra  ^(A^i) and M 2 N 2 M r r AB(N 2 ).
Therefore M N M r =  [ M i N i M r ,  M 2 N 2 Mr] ta A (N ) l \B (N ) .
A, a  . r  a
A ) A  i.e. r i _ A -
By the induction hypothesis, for some M 1, M\rrA r  (— A. Suppose M t TaT,
then M i M t Ta A =  (S =  K). But this is impossible since not CL  |— S  =  K
by 1.7. Hence for no Mr, M t Ta T.
Therefore M i Wa r  \ -A .
V I) V z f e )  U ' f y r i % )  '"tereaffznn.
Simple proof (assuming P a r ( P u  {^ 4}) =  {«}):
By the induction hypothesis, for some Mi, M\rrA r \ - A ( a ) .
Hence for all N  Mi Nr a AY r D A ( N ) .  (*)
Define M  =  Xmrn• Minmr- Claim Mrr* r  |— VxA(x).
Suppose M tta r .  We have to show tha t M M t Ta VxA(x) i.e. tha t for all N
M M rNrAA(N).
Since M M r N  =  M i N M r  this follows from (*).
Detailed proof
Let {a} =  Par ( r  U {VxA(x)}), then a $ { a \ .
By the induction hypothesis, for some Mi, MirrA r  (- A(a).
Hence for all N  (corresponding to a), N: M i N N r A AY r ( N ) Z )A (N , N)
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Define M  — Xnmrn-Minnmr,  where n corresponds to N.  As above it
follows tha t M tva r  |— VxA(x).
M x  A  (x)¿Lx A (x) B  ^  r \ - S x A ( x )  r ,  A (a) \- B
b  r \ - B
where
a $ Par (T, B, S[xA(x)).
Simple proof (Assuming a is the only parameter around).
By the induction hypothesis, for some Mi,  M 2 , M\r rA r \ - S x A ( x )  and 
M%rrA r ,  A(ci) [— B  i.e. M 2 rrA /A  TZ) (A(a) Z) B).
Define M  = forir* (M2 {Mimr) im(Mi  mr)o). Claim MrrA T  \- B. Suppose 
M  r rA r .  Then M\ M r  ta Six A (a;) and for all N , M^N M  r r  a A{N)  D P . 
Thus (Mi Mr)orAA{(M\Mr)i)  and M 2 {Mi Mr)i  Mri'A A((MMr)i)Z)B.  
Therefore M M r = M 2 (M iMr) iMr(M i  Mt)qTa B.
Detailed proof
Let [a] = Par (f  U [3ixA(x)})
{6} =  Par (P  U {B}) — {a}, then a $ [a, b}.
Let N a and na correspond to a and let Nb and n& correspond to b. 
By the induction hypothesis, for some Mi,  M 2,
MirrA AY P(a) D 3xA(a,  x)
and
M 2 rra AY P(a) D (A(a, a) D B(a, b))-
Define M = h tan\)mr- M 2na(Minamr)i nbmr{Minamr)o- 
As above we see tha t Mrr^T \- B.
3.7. Corollary
If \ - A ,  then there exists a term M  such tha t for all A Mr a A 
Proof
Immediate by 3.6. and 3.4.i).
3.8. Theorem
(CL)i is closed under the rule of choice, i.e. if (CL)i |— Y x 3 y A ( x , y), 
then there exists a term M  such tha t (CL)i \ -VxA(x,  Mx).
Proof
Let (CL)i |— Y x 3 y  A(x, y). Then, for some Mo, Mor^ YxHy A(x, y).
So M 0 ar# My A (a, y). Therefore (Moa)or<t>A(a, (Mqci)i) and \- A (a, (M0 a) 1). 
Let M  =  Xa{Mod)i. Then (- YxA(x} Mx).
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3.9. Theorem
If  (AC) \-A ,  then, there exists a term M  such tha t Mr(AC)A.
Proof
If  (AC) \- A, then r  |— A, where r  is a finite set of instances of (AC). 
Hence for some Mo, M ot a^c) P  (— A.
Now every closed instance of (AC) is realized by
Mi =  (Xa • [Xb • (ab)o, Xb • (a6)i])*
If  an instance of (AC) contains the parameters a, then it is realized
by Xa-Mi.
Hence Mr(AC)P, where the elements of M  are of the form Xa-M\. 
Therefore MoMr^AC) A.  ■
3 .1 0 .  Corollary
(CL)i+ (AC) is conservative over CL, and hence consistent.
Proof
Let (AC) \ - N i = N 2. Then for some M, M r^c)  N i  = N 2.
Hence CL |— =  No. ■
3 .1 1 .  Definition
1) A  theor}r T  is (strongly) disjunctive iff for all sentences (resp. formulas) 
A V B  we have T \ - A V B = > T \ -  A  or T  \- B.
2) A  theory T  is (strongly) existential iff for all sentences (resp. formulas) 
HxA(x) we have T  \-HxA(x)  =>for some term M  of T, T  \ -A(M ).
•  •
3 .1 2 .  Theorem
The theories (CL)i and (CL)i -f (AC) are strongly disjunctive and 
strongly existential.
Proof
Suppose (CL)i |— A V B. Then, for some M, Mr^A V B.
Hence (M)o = K  and 0 |— A  or (M)o = K + and 0 \ -B .
Thus (CL)i (- A  or (CL)i \ -B .
Similar for the existential property and similar for (CL)i +  (AC). ■ 
Remarks
Theorems 3 .8  and 3 .1 2  (for (CL)i) can be proved also using the normal­
ization theorem for intuitionistic logic, see P r a w i t z  [1 9 6 5 ] .  Independently 
S t a t m a n  [1 9 7 2 ]  gives an extension of the normalization theorem, from 
which theorems 3 .1 0  and 3 .1 2  (for (CL)i+(AC))  follow implicitely.
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4. S o m e  o t h e r  r e s u l t s
In  this § we first obtain results analogous to those in § 3 about combi­
natory logic with extensionality and the term rule. In the case of the 
term rule we cannot work with realization by a combinator and use 
instead a concept analogous to Kleene’s
4 .1 .  Definition 
Ext is the axiom Y x Y  y \ Y  z(xz = yz) D x = y\.
ext is the rule —~rr~, where a $ Par (MN)M  = N
4.2. Lemma
(CL)c + Ext, and hence (CL)i -f Ext, is conservative over CL + ext and 
therefore consistent.
Proof
Like the proof of 2 .12, using the well known fact tha t CL -f ext is 
consistent. (This follows for example from 4 .5 . ) .
4 .3 . Theorem.
i) (CL)i +  Ext -f (AC) is conservative over CL +  ext.
ii) (CL)/ -f E xt and (CL)/ +  Ext + (AC) are strongly disjunctive and 
strongly existential.
iii) (CL)i +  Ext is closed under the rule of choice.
Proof
Replace in the definition of Mr^A,  for the case tha t A is Ni  =  N 2, 
CL I— N\ =  N 2 by C L -b ext \- N\  =  N 2. Then 3 .7  and 3 .9  becomes true for 
the new realization concept. Furthermore E xt is realizable in the new 
sense.
Hence we have the analogues of 3 .8 ,  3 .1 0  and 3 .1 2
4 .4 .  Definition
T P  (term rule for (CL)) is the rule
A(Z)  for all closed Z
Yx A (x)
tr (term rule for CL) is the rule
M Z  =  N Z  for all closed Z 
M Z  = N Z  for all Z
co (co-rule for CL) is the rule
M Z  =  N Z  for all closed Z
M  = N
4 .5 .  Lemma
CL + tr +  ext  is equivalent with CL + co and therefore consistent.
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Proof
The equivalence is trivial. The consistency of CL + co is proved in
B a r e n d r e g t  [1 9 7 1 ] ,  § 2 .2 .
4.6. Theorem
i) (CL)c + T R  +  E xt is conservative over CL +  tr +  ext  and hence con­
sistent.
ii) (CL) c +  T R  is conservative over CL + tr.
iii) (CL)c +  T R  +  M  = N( +  Ext) is conservative over CL  + tr + M  = N 
( -f ext).
Proof
i) Let J i  be the strict term model of CL +  tr +  ext  (where strict refers 
to the fact tha t the domain consists of the closed terms up to provable 
equality). By the consistency of CL +  tr+ ext  |= K ^ S .
Hence e Mod ((CL)c + T R  +  Ext).
Suppose now (CL)cJr T R  +  E xt |— M  =  N, then 
CL + tr +  ext |— M  =  N.
ii), iii) vSimilar.
Remark
I t  is not known whether CL-\-tr is conservative over CL  or whether
CL-Mr + ext is conservative over CL  + ext. For a partial result in this
direction see B a r e n d r e g t  [1971], § 2.5.
M  =  N , hence
4 .7 .  Theorem
The various conservative extention result obtained can be summarized 
as follows:
conservative
1)
r
conservative non conservativer~
CL
~] I—
(CL)j
1
I
(CL)! + AC
L
(CL)
J
conservative
2)
conservative
CL +  tr {CL), +  T R
(CL)c +  T R
______________ I
conservative
The same holds for both cases if  extensionality is included.
Fig . 3
Proof
This follows by combining 2 .11, 2 .12, 3.10, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.6.
4.8. Theorem
(CL)i A- TR +  Ext and (CL)i -f TR  are disjunctive and existential. 
Proof
(For (CL)i+ TR +  Ext, the proof for (CL)r + TR  is similar).
Let T =  (CL)i +  TR +  Ext.
We define inductively \A for sentences A.
1 ' I
\M =  N  iff CL +  tr +  ext  h  M  = N
\A A B iff \A and |B
\A V B  iff (|x4 and |— t A)  or (|j3 and |— t B)
|A D B  iff (\A and \ - T A) =>\B
|YxA(x) iff for all closed N  |x4(iY).
\SxA(x) iff for some closed N  |^4(iV) and |-t-4 (A 7).
If A is a formula, then \A iff \A*, where A* is the universal closure 
of A.
iff | /A  rZ)  A (for finite r) .
As in § 3 we can prove F \ - t A = > \ r \ - A .
Hence |— t A => \ A.
Now suppose |— t A V B, where A , B  are sentences.
Then \A V B. Hence \ - t  A or |— t  B. Therefore T  is disjunctive.
In the same way we see tha t T is existential. ■
In contrast to the case in arithmetic, where Peano-f TR  is complete, 
(CL) c + T7?-fE x t is not a complete theory:
4.9. Theorem
Let (o =  (Xa-aa) and £2 =  coco. Then Q K  = K  is an undecidable sentence 
in (C,jL)c-fTi? + Ext.
Proof
Jacopini has proved (unpublished) tha t CL +  co -1- Q =  Xa• a is consistent. 
Hence by 4.5 and 4.6. iii) (CL)c + TR +  Ext + Q K  = K  is consistent. 
Hence not (CL)c +  TR  +  E xt |— Q K  ¥=K.
Suppose now that (CL)c+ T R -f E x t | - Q K  =  K .
Then by 4.5. and 4.6. CL +  co |— Q K  =  K.
Hence b}7 B a r e n d r e g t  [1971], 2 .2 .1 2  CL \ - Q K K  ... K  =  K,  where 
K  ... K  is a sequence of 1C s.
This contradicts the Church-Rosser property of CL.
Hence not (CL)c+  Ti? +  E xt \ - Q K  =  K.  ■
9 9  I
¿ d  ê mi  X
O p e n  p r o b l e m s
1 . Is (CL)r +  T B +  (AC)( -fExt) consistent?
2 . Is (CL)r + TR( +  Ext) conservative over CL(-l-ex t)?1)
3. Does the disjunctive and existential property for formulas hold for
(CL)i + TR{ +  Ext) ?
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